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Abstract
Cognitive radio (CR) systems allow opportunistic, secondary users (SUs) to access portions of the spectrum that
are unused by the network’s licensed primary users (PUs), provided that the induced interference does not compromise
the PU’ performance guarantees. To account for interference constraints of this type, we consider a flexible spectrum
access pricing scheme that charges SUs based on the interference that they cause to the system’s PUs (individually,
globally, or both), and we examine how SUs can maximize their achievable transmission rate in this setting. We show
that the resulting non-cooperative game admits a unique Nash equilibrium under very mild assumptions on the pricing
mechanism employed by the network operator, and under both static and ergodic (fast-fading) channel conditions. In
addition, we derive a dynamic power allocation policy that converges to equilibrium within a few iterations (even for
large numbers of users), and which relies only on local signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) measurements;
importantly, the proposed algorithm retains its convergence properties even in the ergodic channel regime, despite
the inherent stochasticity thereof. Our theoretical analysis is complemented by extensive numerical simulations which
illustrate the performance and scalability properties of the proposed pricing scheme under realistic network conditions.
Index Terms
Cognitive radio; multi-carrier systems; interference temperature; pricing; exponential learning.
I. Introduction
Greatly raising the bar from previous generation upgrades, current design specifications for 5th generation (5G)
wireless systems target a massive increase in network capacity, fiber-like connection speeds (well into the Gb/s range),
and an immersive overall user experience with zero effective latency and response times [1, 2]. As such, the ICT
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2industry is faced with a formidable challenge: these ambitious design goals require the deployment of new wireless
interfaces at an unprecedented scale, but the necessary overhaul is limited by the inherent constraints of upgrading an
entrenched (and often ageing) wireless infrastructure.
Chief among these concerns is the projected spectrum crunch: if not properly managed, the existing radio spectrum
will not be able to accommodate the soaring demand for wireless broadband and the ever-growing volume of data
traffic [3]. To make matters worse, studies by the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) have shown that this vital commodity is effectively
squandered through underutilization and inefficient use: for instance, only 15% to 85% of the licensed radio spectrum
is used on average, leaving ample spectral voids that could be exploited via efficient spectrum management techniques
[3, 4]. Accordingly, in this often unregulated context, the emerging paradigm of cognitive radio (CR) has attracted
considerable interest as a promising way out of the spectrum gridlock [5–8].
At its most basic level, cognitive radio comprises a two-level hierarchy between wireless users induced by spectrum
licencing: the network’s licensed, primary users (PUs) have purchased spectrum rights from the network operator
(often in the form of contractual quality of service (QoS) guarantees), but they allow unlicenced secondary users (SUs)
to access the spectrum provided that the induced co-channel interference (CCI) remains below a certain threshold
[5, 7]. Put differently, by sensing the wireless medium, the network’s cognitive SUs essentially free-ride on the PUs’
licensed spectrum and they try to communicate under the constraints imposed by the PUs (though, of course, without
any QoS guarantees). Thus, by opening up the unused part of the spectrum to opportunistic user access, overall
spectrum utilization is increased without needing to deploy more (and more expensive) wireless interfaces [6, 9].
Of course, given the non-cooperative nature of this opportunistic framework, throughput optimization in CR envi-
ronments calls for flexible and decentralized optimization policies with minimal information exchange between SUs,
PUs, and access points/base stations. In particular, a major challenge involves safeguarding the performance guarantees
that the network’s licensed primary users have already paid for: if secondary users are allowed to transmit without
some power/interference control mechanism in place, then the primary users’ QoS requirements may be violated, thus
invalidating the fundamental operational premise of CR systems. To that end, the authors of [10–13] investigated the
role of pricing as an effective mechanism to control interference and they provided an energy/cost-efficient formulation
of the problem where users seek to maximize their transmission rate while keeping their transmit power in check. To
reach a stable equilibrium state in this setting, several distributed approaches have been proposed, based chiefly on
reaction functions [10], Gauss-Seidel and Jacobi update algorithms [12], or learning methods [13, 14]; however, these
works do not distinguish between licenced and unlicensed users, so their results do not immediately apply to CR
networks.
In CR systems, PU requirements are often treated as interference temperature (IT) [15] constraints that are coupled
across the network’s SUs, and the theoretical analysis of the resulting system aims to characterize the network’s
optimum/unilaterally stable equilibrium states and to provide the means to converge to such states [16–20]. These
constraints are then enforced indirectly via exogenous pricing mechanisms that charge SUs based on the aggregate
interference that they cause to the network’s PUs (and, of course, PUs are reimbursed commensurately). In this context,
3the authors of [16] introduced a spectrum-trading mechanism based on a market-equilibrium approach [21] and they
provided an algorithm allowing SUs to estimate spectrum prices and adjust their spectrum demands accordingly. More
recently, to account for the PUs’ maximum interference tolerance, the authors of [18, 19] introduced a game-theoretic
formulation of CR interference channels where SUs are charged proportionally to the aggregate interference caused;
then, using variational inequality methodologies, they derived sufficient low-interference conditions under which the
resulting game admits a unique Nash equilibrium and they proposed a best-response algorithm that converges to this
equilibrium state. The case of inexact system information was considered in [20] where the authors formulated the
problem as a (deterministic) robust optimization program which can be solved by Lagrangian dual decomposition
methods. A game-theoretic account of the impact of IT constraints on system performance is also studied in [22]
where the authors derive cost-aware optimal power allocation policies by relaxing the problem’s hard IT constraints
and incorporating an exponential cost in the SUs’ utility functions; in this context, the resulting power allocation game
admits a unique equilibrium which is also Pareto efficient in the low-interference regime. Finally, by exploiting the
innate hierarchy between primary and secondary users, the authors of [23] provided a Stackelberg game formulation
where the system’s PU acts as the leader and seeks to maximize the revenue generated by discriminatory spectrum
access pricing mechanisms imposed to SUs (the game’s followers).
That being said, the above works focus almost exclusively on wireless systems with static channel conditions where
the benefits of interference control mechanisms are relatively easy to evaluate; by contrast, very little is known in the
case where the channels vary with time (e.g., due to user mobility). In the presence of (fast) fading, channel gains are
typically assumed to follow a stationary ergodic process, so the users’ throughput and induced interference depend
crucially on the channel statistics. In this stochastic framework, the authors of [14] studied the problem of ergodic rate
maximization in multi-carrier (MC) systems and derived an efficient power allocation algorithm that allows users to
attain the system’s capacity; however, no distinction was made between licensed and unlicensed users, so the results
of [14] do not readily translate to a CR setting. More recently, [24] provided an efficient online learning algorithm
for unilateral rate optimization in dynamic multi-carrier multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) cognitive radio
systems, but, again, without taking into account any IT constraints imposed by the network’s primary users.
In this paper, we consider the problem of cost-efficient throughput maximization in multi-carrier cognitive radio
networks where SUs are charged based on the interference that they cause to the network’s PUs (either on an aggre-
gate or a per-user basis). Our system model is presented in Section II where we consider a general game-theoretic
formulation that is flexible enough to account for both aggregate (flat-rate), temperature-based, and per-user pricing
schemes. In the case of static channels (Section III), we show that the resulting game admits a unique Nash equilibrium
almost surely, provided that the SUs’ pricing schemes satisfy some fairly mild requirements (for instance, that a user’s
transmission cost increases with his radiated power). On the other hand, in the case of fast-fading channels (which
we study in Section IV), we show that the game under study admits a unique Nash equilibrium always, without any
further caveats.
Moreover, extending the exponential learning techniques of [14], we also derive a dynamic power allocation policy
that converges to Nash equilibrium in a few iterations, even for large numbers of users and/or subcarriers per user. In
4particular, the proposed algorithm has the following desirable attributes:
1) Distributedness: user updates are based on local information and signal measurements.
2) Statelessness: users do not need to know the state (or topology) of the system.
3) Unilateral reinforcement: each user tends to increase his own utility; put differently, the algorithm is aligned with
each user’s individual objective.
4) Flexibility: the users’ learning algorithm can be deployed in both static and ergodic (fast-fading) channel envi-
ronments.
As such, even though the static and ergodic channel regimes are fundamentally different, the network’s users do
not have to switch their update structure in order to converge to equilibrium (in the static or fast-fading regime,
respectively).
Finally, our analysis is supplemented in Section V by extensive numerical simulations where we illustrate the
throughput and power gains of the proposed approach under realistic conditions.
II. SystemModel
Consider a set K = {1, . . . , K} of (unlicensed) secondary users (SUs) that seek to connect to a common receiver
over a set S = {1, . . . , S } of non-interfering subcarriers (typically in the frequency domain if an orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing (OFDM) scheme is employed). Focusing on the uplink case, the aggregate received signal ys
over the s-th subcarrier will then be:
ys =
∑
k∈K
hksxks + zs, (1)
where
1) xks ∈  denotes the transmitted signal of user k ∈ K over the s-th subcarrier.
2) hks ∈  is the corresponding transfer coefficient.
3) zs ∈  denotes the aggregate interference-plus-noise received from all sources not in K (including the aggregate
PU transmission on subcarrier s plus ambient and other peripheral interference effects); throughout this paper (and
by performing a suitable change of basis if necessary), we will model zs as a Gaussian variable zs ∼ CN(0, σ2s)
for some positive σs > 0.
In this context, the average transmit power of user k on subcarrier s will be
pks = 
[
|xks|
2], (2)
where the expectation is taken over the (Gaussian) codebook of user k; furthermore, each user’s total transmit power
pk = [x†kxk] =
∑
s pks will have to satisfy the power constraint
pk =
∑
s∈S
pks ≤ Pk, (3)
where Pk > 0 denotes the maximum transmit power of user k ∈ K. In this way, the set of admissible power allocation
vectors for user k is the S -dimensional polytope
Xk =
{
pk ∈ S : pks ≥ 0 and
∑
s∈S pks ≤ Pk
}
, (4)
5and the system’s state space (i.e., the space of all admissible power allocation profiles p = (p1, . . . , pK)) will be the
product X = ∏k Xk.
In this multi-carrier (MC) framework, each user’s achievable transmission rate depends on his individual signal-to-
interference-and-noise ratio (SINR)
sinrks(p) = gks pks
σ2s +
∑
ℓ,k gℓs pℓs
, (5)
where gks = |hks|2 denotes the channel gain coefficient for user k over the s-th subcarrier. Thus, in the single user
decoding (SUD) regime (where interference by all other users is treated as additive noise), the maximum information
transmission rate for user k (achievable with random Gaussian codes) will be:
Rk(p) =
∑
s∈S
log
(
1 + sinrks(p)) = ∑
s∈S
[
log
(
σ2s + ws(p)
)
− log
(
σ2s +
∑
ℓ,k
gℓs pℓs
)]
(6)
where
ws(p) =
∑
k
gks pks, s = 1, . . . , S , (7)
denotes the aggregate SU interference level per subcarrier (for convenience we will also write w = (w1, . . . ,wS ) for
the SUs’ aggregate interference profile over all subcarriers s ∈ S).
In the absence of other considerations, the unilateral objective of each SU would be the maximization of his
individual transmission rate Rk(p) subject to the total power constraint (3). In our CR setting however, the network
operator needs to ensure that the system’s PUs meet the QoS guarantees that they have already paid for – typically
in the form of minimum rate requirements or maximum interference tolerance per subcarrier. Thus, to achieve this,
we will consider a general spectrum access pricing scheme whereby SUs are charged according to the individual and
aggregate interference that they cause to the network’s PUs.
Formally, this can be captured by the general cost model:
Ck(p) = π0(w(p)) + πk(pk), (8)
where:
1) π0 : S+ → + is a flat spectrum access price that is calculated in terms of the aggregate SU interference level ws
per subcarrier s ∈ S.
2) πk : Xk → + is a user-specific price which is charged to user k ∈ K based on his individual radiated power
profile pk ∈ Xk.
In tune with standard economic considerations on diminishing returns [21], the only assumptions that we will make
for the price functions π0 and πk are that:
(A1) Every price function π is non-decreasing in each of its arguments.
(A2) Every price function π is Lipschitz continuous and convex.
In particular, the convexity assumption (A2) acts as an interference control mechanism for the system: by charging SUs
higher spectrum access prices for the same increase in interference when the network operates in a high-interference
state, SUs are implicitly encouraged to transmit at lower powers, thus creating less co-channel interference (CCI) to
6the network’s SUs. In this way, the pricing scheme (8) is flexible enough to account for very diverse pricing paradigms:
if π0 ≡ 0, the network’s SUs are charged on an equitable user-by-user basis, based only on the individual interference
that each individual user induces to the network’s PUs;1 otherwise, if πk ≡ 0, the pricing model (8) allows the network
operator to reimburse infractions to the PUs’ contractual QoS guarantees by imposing an aggregate “sanction” to the
network’s SUs (who were responsible for causing the violation in the first place).
The specifics of the pricing functions π0 and πk are negotiated between network users and operators based on their
needs and means, so they can vary widely depending on the context – see e.g. [10, 13, 18, 22, 23]. For concreteness,
we provide below some typical examples of pricing models which we explore further in Section V:2
Model 1. Let Imaxs denote the PUs’ interference tolerance on subcarrier s. Then, in the spirit of [18], we define the
linear pricing (LP) flat-rate model as:
πLP0 (w) = λ0
∑
s∈S
ws/Imaxs , (LP)
where the pricing parameter λ0 represents the price paid by the network’s SUs when saturating the PUs’
interference tolerance. In words, SUs are charged a flat-rate which is proportional to the degree of saturation
of the PUs’ interference tolerance level, so the model (LP) treats the PUs’ requirements as a soft constraint.
Model 2. With notation as above, the violation pricing (VP) flat-rate model is defined as:
πVP0 (w) = λ0
∑
s∈S
[
ws/Imaxs − 1
]
+ (VP)
where λ0 > 0 is a sensitivity parameter and [x]+ ≡ max{x, 0}. In this model, SUs are only charged when
the PUs’ interference tolerance is actually violated, and the steepness of the sanction is controlled by the
pricing parameter λ0; as such, in the large λ0 limit, (VP) treats the PUs’ requirements as a hard constraint
with very sharp violation costs.
In light of all this, the utility of user k is defined as:
uk(p) = Rk(p) − Ck(p), (9)
i.e., uk(p) is simply the user’s achieved transmission rate minus the cost reimbursed to the network operator in order to
achieve it. In turn, this leads to the cost-efficient throughput maximization game G ≡ G(K,X, u), defined as follows:
1) The game’s players are the system’s secondary users k ∈ K = {1, . . . , K}.
2) The action set of each player/user is the set of feasible power allocation profiles Xk = {pk ∈ S : pks ≥
0 and ∑s∈S pks ≤ Pk}.
3) Each player’s utility function uk : X ≡ ∏k Xk →  is given by (9).
In this context, we will say that a power allocation profile p∗ ∈ X is at Nash equilibrium (NE) when
uk(p∗k; p∗−k) ≥ uk(pk; p∗−k) for all pk ∈ Xk and for all k ∈ K, (NE)
1Likewise, πk could also account for the actual cost incurred by the user to recharge the battery of his wireless device as in [13].
2For simplicity, we focus on the flat-rate case; the corresponding user-specific price functions πk are defined similarly.
7i.e., when each user’s chosen power profile p∗k ∈ Xk is individually cost-efficient given the power profile of his
opponents (so no user has a unilateral incentive to deviate). Accordingly, our goal in the rest of the paper will be
to characterize the Nash equilibria of G and to provide distributed optimization methods allowing selfish (and myopic)
SUs to converge to equilibrium in the absence of centralized medium access control mechanisms.
III. Equilibrium Analysis, Learning and Convergence
In this section, we focus on the characterization of the NE of the cost-efficient rate maximization game G and on
how players can attain such a state by means of a simple, adaptive learning process.
A. Equilibrium structure and characterization
A key property of the rate maximization game G is that it admits a potential function [25]:
Proposition 1. Let w be the aggregate SU interference level defined as in (7). Then, the function
V(p) =
∑
s
log
(
σ2s + ws
)
− π0(w) −
∑
k
πk(pk) (10)
is an exact potential for the cost-efficient rate maximization game G; specifically:
uk(pk; p−k) − uk(p′k; p−k) = V(pk; p−k) − V(p′k; p−k) (11)
for all pk, p′k ∈ Xk and for all p−k ∈ X−k ≡
∏
ℓ,k Xk.
Proof: By inspection.
Since the price functions π0 and πk are convex, the potential function V is itself concave (though not necessarily
strictly so; see below). By Proposition 1, it then follows that maximizers of V are NE of G (so the Nash set of G is
nonempty); furthermore, with V concave in p and uk concave in pk, every NE of G is also a maximizer of V . In this
way, finding the equilibria of G boils down to the nonlinear optimization problem:
maximize V(p),
subject to pks ≥ 0,
∑
s
pks ≤ Pk.
(12)
Thanks to this formulation, we obtain the following equilibrium uniqueness result for G:
Theorem 1. Assume that:
(C1) Each user-specific price function πk is strictly increasing in each of its arguments.
or:
(C2) The flat spectrum access price function π0 is either gentle enough or steep enough : 0 ≤ ∂π0∂ws <
(
σ2s +
∑
k gksPk
)−1
or
∂π0
∂ws
> 1/σ2s for all ws and for all subcarriers s ∈ S.
Then, the cost-efficient throughput maximization game G admits a unique Nash equilibrium for almost all realizations
of the channel gain coefficients gks. More generally, even if both (C1) and (C2) fail to hold, the set of Nash equilibria
of G is a convex polytope of dimension at most S (K − 1).
8Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 1. The “almost all” part of the statement of Theorem 1 should be interpreted with respect to Lebesgue measure
– i.e., uniqueness holds except for a set of price functions and channel gain coefficients of Lebesgue measure zero. In
particular, if channel gains are drawn at the outset of the game following some fixed, continuous probability distribution
(e.g., induced by the SUs’ spatial distribution), then this means that G admits a unique equilibrium with probability 1.
B. Exponential learning and convergence to equilibrium
The equilibrium characterization of Theorem 1 is crucial from the standpoint of dynamic spectrum management
(DSM) because it guarantees a very robust solution set (a convex polytope); in fact, as we just saw, the game’s
equilibrium set is a singleton under fairly mild conditions for the users’ price functions (e.g., that the user-specific
price functions πk be strictly increasing). Regardless, given that it is far from clear how the system’s users can compute
the solution of the problem (NE), our goal in this section will be to provide a distributed learning mechanism that can
be employed by the system’s users in order to reach a Nash equilibrium.
Our proposed algorithm will rely on the users’ marginal utilities:
vk(p) = ∇kuk(p) (13)
where∇k denotes differentiation with respect to the power profile pk of user k. In particular, writing vk = (vk,1, . . . , vk,S ),
some easy algebra yields the component-wise expression
vks(p) = ∂uks
∂pks
= gks
(
1
σ2s + ws
−
∂π0
∂ws
)
−
∂πk
∂pks
, (14)
which shows that vks(p) can be calculated by each individual user knowing only their SINR per subcarrier (which is
measured locally) and the functional form of the price functions π0 and πk (which are agreed upon by the network’s
SUs and the PU and are thus also known locally). Indeed, Eq. (5) shows that the aggregate interference level on
subcarrier s can be calculated by user k as:
ws(p) =
∑
k
gks pks = gks pks +
∑
ℓ,k
gℓs pℓs = gks pks +
gks pks
sinrks(p) = gks pks
1 + sinrks(p)
sinrks(p) , (15)
i.e., requiring only local SINR measurements and the knowledge of the user’s channel (which can in turn be obtained
through the exchange of pilot signals). As a result, the marginal utility vectors vk can be calculated in a completely
distributed fashion with locally available information.
By definition, the users’ marginal utility vectors define the direction of unilaterally steepest utility ascent, i.e., the
best direction that a user could follow in order to increase his utility. As such, a natural learning process would be for
each user to track this steepest ascent direction with the hopes of converging to a Nash equilibrium; however, given
the problem’s power and positivity constraints, this method may quickly lead to inadmissible power profiles that do
not lie in X – in which case convergence is also out of the question.
To account for these constraints, we will employ an interior point method which increases power on subcarriers
that seem to be performing well, without ever shutting off a particular channel completely. Formally, consider the
9exponential regularization map G : S → S+ given by
G(v) = 1
1 +
∑
s exp(vs)
(
exp(v1), . . . , exp(vS )) . (16)
This map has the property that it assigns positive weight (power) to all subcarriers and exponentially more weight
to the subcarriers s ∈ S with the highest marginal utilities vs. Furthermore, if all marginal utilities are relatively low
(indicating high transmission costs), all assigned weights will also be low in order to decrease the user’s cost. With
this in mind, our proposed exponential learning algorithm for cost-efficient rate maximization is as follows:
Algorithm 1 Exponential Learning for Cost-Efficient Rate Maximization
Parameter: step size γn.
Initialize: n ← 0; scores yks ← 0 for all k ∈ K, s ∈ S.
Repeat
n ← n + 1;
foreach user k ∈ K do
foreach subcarrier s ∈ S do
set transmit power pks ← Pk
exp(yks)
1 +
∑
r exp(ykr)
;
measure sinrks;
update marginal utilities: vks ←
1
pks
sinrks
1 + sinrks
−
∂Ck
∂pks
;
update scores: yks ← yks + γnvks;
until termination criterion is reached.
From an implementation point of view, Algorithm 1 has the following desirable properties:
(P1) It is distributed: users only need local or publicly available information in order to run it.
(P2) It is stateless: users do not need to know the state of the system (e.g., its topology).
(P3) It is reinforcing: users tend to allocate more power to cost-efficient subcarriers.
We then obtain:
Theorem 2. Let γn be a variable step-size sequence such that
∑
n γn = ∞ and
∑n
j=1 γ
2
j
/∑n
j=1 γ j → 0. Then, Algorithm
1 converges to Nash equilibrium in the cost-efficient rate maximization game G.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark. The condition ∑nj=1 γ2j/∑nj=1 γ j → 0 requires the use of a decreasing step-size γn (which slows down the
algorithm), but the rate of decay of γn can be arbitrarily slow – in stark contrast to the much more stringent requirement∑
j γ2j < ∞ that is common in the theory of stochastic approximation [26]. As such, Algorithm 1 can be used with an
effectively constant (very slowly varying) step-size, and still converge to equilibrium; we explore this issue in detail in
Section V.
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IV. Fast-Fading and UserMobility
Our analysis so far has focused on static channels, corresponding to wireless users with little or no mobility. In
this section, we investigate the case of mobile users where the channel gain coefficients evolve over time following a
stationary ergodic process.
In this fast-fading regime, the users’ achievable rate is given by the ergodic average [27]:
¯Rk(p) = g Rk(p) =
∑
s∈S
g log
(
1 + gks pks
σ2s +
∑
ℓ,k gℓs pℓs
)
, (17)
leading to the corresponding average utility functions:
u¯k(p) = ¯Rk(p) − g[Ck(p)] = ¯Rk(p) − g [π0(w) + πk(pk)], (18)
where the expectation g[·] is taken with respect to the law of the channel gain coefficients gks = |hks|2 (recall here
that the aggregate multi-user interference-plus-noise (MUI) per subcarrier ws = ∑k∈K gks pks depends itself on the
realization of the channels). We thus obtain the following game-theoretic formulation of cost-efficient throughput
maximization in the presence of fast fading:
maximize u¯k(pk; p−k) (unilaterally for all k ∈ K),
subject to pk ∈ Xk.
(19)
As in the static regime, we then obtain the following characterization of Nash equilibria:
Proposition 2. With notation as above, let
¯V(p) =
∑
s
g log
(
σ2s + ws
)
− g
[
π0(w) +
∑
k
πk(pk)
]
. (20)
Then, ¯V(p) is an exact potential for the ergodic rate maximization game ¯G ≡ ¯G(K,X, u¯). In particular, if the channels’
law is atom-free (i.e., it is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure), ¯V is strictly concave and ¯G admits
a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Proposition 2 shows that the inherent stochasticity in the users’ channels actually helps in guaranteeing a very
robust solution set for the cost-efficient throughput maximization problem (19) (see also [14] for a related result in
the context of rate control). On the other hand, the expectation over the users’ channels is typically hard to carry
out (especially beyond the Gaussian i.i.d. regime), so it is not clear how to calculate the ergodic marginal utilities
v¯k(p) = ∇ku¯k(p) = g[v(p)]. Thus, instead of trying to reach a Nash equilibrium by employing a variant of Alg. 1
run with the users’ ergodic marginal utilities (whose calculation requires considerable computation capabilities and a
good deal of knowledge on the channels’ statistics), we will consider the same sequence of events as in the case of
static channels:
1) At every update period n = 1, 2, . . . , each user k ∈ K calculates his instantaneous marginal utility vector vk(n)
following (14):
vˆks(n) = 1pks(n)
sinrks(n)
1 + sinrks(n) −
∂Ck
pks
∣∣∣∣∣
p(n)
(21)
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TABLE I
Simulation Setting
Parameter Value
Carrier frequency fc = 2.4 GHz
Channel bandwidth B = 10.93 KHz
Noise spectral density σs = −173 dBm/Hz
Maximum transmitting power of SUs Pk = 21.03 dBm
Edge of the simulated square area L = 200 m
Transmitting power of the PU PPU = 30 dBm
Distance of the PU from the receiver d = 50 m
TABLE II
PU’s Requirements
Data Rate Imax
12.8 KHz −68.3 dBm
16 KHz −70 dBm
32 KHz −75.6 dBm
2) Users update their powers following the recursion step of Alg. 1, and the process repeats.
Remarkably, despite the inherent stochasticity, we have:
Theorem 3. Assume that the variance of the users’ channel gain coefficients is finite. If Alg. 1 is run with step-sizes
γn such that
∑
n γn = ∞ and
∑n
j=1 γ
2
j
/∑n
j=1 γ j → 0, then the users’ power profiles converge to Nash equilibrium in the
cost-efficient ergodic rate maximization game ¯G (a.s.).
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 2. Thanks to Theorem 3, we see that Algorithm 1 enjoys the additional property:
(P4) Flexibility: users can apply the algorithm “as-is” in both static and fast-fading environments.
V. Numerical Results
To evaluate the performance of the proposed cost-efficient power allocation framework for throughput maximiza-
tion in cognitive radio networks, we have performed extensive numerical simulations over a wide range of system
parameters. In what follows, we provide a selection of the most representative cases.
Throughout this section, and unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, we consider a population of K = 10 SUs
uniformly distributed over a square area and S = 10 non-interfering subcarriers with channel gain coefficients gks
drawn according to the path-loss model for Jakes fading proposed in [28]; the other relevant simulation parameters are
summarized in Table I. For simplicity, we also assume that σs and Pk are equal for all s ∈ S and all k ∈ K; finally, we
will assume that PUs have the same interference tolerance level Imaxs over all subcarriers s ∈ S.
To begin with, we evaluate the impact of interference pricing on the SUs’ behavior by introducing the violation
index
Ψs = ws/Imax, (22)
i.e., the amount of interference generated by SUs on the s-th subcarrier relative to the PUs’ tolerance. Obviously,
Ψs ≤ 1 means that the system’s interference temperature (IT) requirements are not violated, whereas Ψs > 1 indicates
a violation of the PUs’ contractual QoS guarantees that will have to be reimbursed by the network’s SUs. Accordingly,
12
in Fig. 1, we plot the system’s average violation index Ψ = 1/|S|∑s∈SΨs as a function of the pricing parameter λ0 for
different values of the maximum interference tolerance level Imax under the flat-rate pricing scheme π0(w). As can be
seen, if the PUs’ maximum interference tolerance level is low (i.e., Imax is small), SUs violate the resulting interference
temperature constraint only if the value of the price parameter λ0 is also low. Thus, the PUs’ QoS guarantees are
violated only in the “soft pricing” regime where the pricing parameter λ0 is not high enough to safeguard the PUs’
low interference tolerance. On the other hand, if the cost incurred due to violations is high enough, no violations are
performed: our simulations show that under both the LP and VP models, there exists a threshold value of the cost
parameter λ0 such that the violation index at the game’s NE is always less than one, i.e., the interference generated by
SUs on each subcarrier is never higher than the PUs’ IT constraints.
That being said, increasing the flat-rate pricing parameter λ0 can lead to significantly different SU behavior with
respect to the PUs’ interference tolerance level.3 In fact, under the LP pricing model, SU interference disincentives
can become excessive: Fig. 1 shows that transmission costs for high λ0 are so high (even for low interference levels)
that SUs prefer to shut down and stop transmitting altogether. On the other hand, under the VP model, λ0 affects the
outcome of the game only if the PUs’ maximum interference tolerance is low: increasing λ0 beyond a certain value
does not lead SUs to shut down and does not impact their sum-rate at equilibrium, precisely because SUs are charged
only if they cause excessive interference to the system’s primary users.
To illustrate the system’s transient phase when users employ Algorithm 1 to optimize their utility, Fig. 2 shows the
aggregate interference on a given subcarrier when the interference constraint is set to Imax = −70 dBm and users are
charged based on the VP flat-rate model. We see there that the PU’s interference constraint is violated only during
the first few iterations of the learning process: when the interference in a given subcarrier exceeds the PUs’ tolerance,
the SUs experience a sharp drop in their marginal utilities (14) because of the incurred cost πVP0 (w), so Algorithm 1
prompts them to reduce their radiated power in the next iteration in order to avoid further violations. In this way, SU
violations are quickly reduced and the users’ learning process converges to a violation-free Nash equilibrium of the
cost-efficient throughput maximization game.
In Fig. 3, we evaluate the impact of pricing and power constraints on the system’s performance at Nash equilibrium
for different pricing models. Under the VP model, the SUs’ sum-rate at equilibrium is affected by the cost parameter
λ0 only when λ0 is small: the reason for this is that SUs do not violate the PUs’ interference temperature constraints
for high λ0 (cf. Fig. 1), so their transmit power and sum-rate at equilibrium remains (almost) constant for high λ0. On
the other hand, as in the case of Fig. 1, Fig. 3 shows that the LP model (solid lines) is strongly affected by the pricing
parameter λ0, for all λ0 values: since increasing λ0 in the LP model increases transmission costs across the board, each
SU is pushed to reduce his individual transmit power in order to reduce the induced mutual interference in the network
commensurately. It is worth noting however that increasing transmission costs is not always detrimental to SUs under
the LP model: as shown in Fig. 3, there is a pricing parameter region where the overall interference on a given channel
3Recall here that, under VP, the system’s SUs are not charged when their aggregate interference ws is lower than Imax, and are (steeply) fined
otherwise; by contrast, the LP model charges users even when the system’s IT constraints are not violated.
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learning process under the LP model, (Imaxs = −70 dBm).
decreases when λ0 is increased, thus enabling users to achieve higher data rates (due to the decreased interference on
the channel). Nonetheless, in the presence of much higher transmission costs, the radiated power of SUs is too low to
carry any significant amount of information, thus leading to a decrease in achievable throughput.
We also show the impact of different system configurations on the achievable SU performance by plotting the users’
average sum-rate at equilibrium for different values of the system’s congestion index, i.e., the ratio K/S between
the number of SUs accessing the system and the number of available subcarriers. As expected, networks with low
congestion (i.e., K/S = 0.5, 1) exhibit better performance than highly congested networks (i.e., K/S = 1.5): when
there is a higher number of SUs trying to access the network, the mutual interference also increases, thus causing
considerable losses in throughput and leading SUs to shut down instead of incurring high transmission costs for
moderate-to-low gains in throughput.
In Fig. 4 we illustrate how the SUs’ sum-rate at equilibrium varies as a function of the PUs’ interference tolerance
Imax for different pricing schemes (linear vs. violation pricing and flat-rate vs. per-user pricing). Obviously, when SU
transmission comes at no cost (the λ0 = 0 case), the value of Imax does not impact the outcome of the game. On the
other hand, when λ0 > 0, the SUs’ average sum-rate increases as the PUs’ interference tolerance increases up to a
critical value Imaxc where the SUs’ sum-rate achieves its maximum value. For any tolerance level Imax > Imaxc , the SUs’
average sum-rate starts decreasing and eventually converges to a well-defined limit value as Imax → ∞, corresponding
to the case where the PU is allowing free access to the leased part of the spectrum. This occurrence is similar to
what we have already discussed in Fig. 3 and stems from the fact that low prices (small λ0) and/or high interference
tolerance (large Imax) do not provide a strong disincentive for SUs to reduce their power level; as a result, the mutual
interference across SUs also increases and leads to a decrease in the achievable performance of the secondary network.
Importantly, when Imax is relatively low, the LP and VP models exhibit different behaviors, illustrated by the fact that
the SUs’ sum-rate at equilibrium differs. By contrast, (LP) and (VP) both tend to zero as Imax → ∞, so their behavior
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for very large Imax is similar and the system converges to the same sum-rate value.
The observed sum-rate maximum for intermediate values of Imax can be explained as follows: in the intolerant
regime (small Imax), users hardly transmit at all because of the PUs’ strict QoS requirements; on the other hand, in
the “open network” regime (large Imax), each user selfishly transmits at maximum power in order to maximize his
individual throughput (since there is no cost balancing factor), thus increasing interference and reducing the users’
sum-rate (in a manner similar to the classical prisoner’s dilemma). As a result, the SUs’ sum-rate is maximized for an
intermediate value of Imax where SUs have to control their power in order to avoid being charged for IT violations:
in other words, a proper choice of Imax (or, equivalently, λ0) allows SUs to achieve a state which is both unilaterally
stable and Pareto efficient (in the sense described above).
Finally, in Fig. 4 we also investigate the difference between flat-rate pricing (π0) and per-user pricing (πk) models.
Both models exhibit similar properties, but for noticeably different values of λ0: specifically, to achieve the same sum-
rate under per-user pricing, lower values of λ0 should be considered, because users are much more sensitive to the
value of λ0 in the per-user paradigm.
In Fig. 5 we illustrate the transmission rate and revenue achieved by the PU as a function of the pricing parameter
λ0 for different values of Imax under the LP and VP schemes. Specifically, the PU’s sum-rate is calculated as
RPU(w) =
∑
s∈S
log
(
1 + sinrPUs (ws)
)
, (23)
where sinrPUs (ws) = gPUPPU/ws is the PU’s SINR on the s-th subcarrier, and gPU and PPU denote the PU’s channel
gain and transmit power, respectively; by the same token, the revenue of the PU is simply Kπ0 +
∑
k πk, i.e., the sum
of the charges paid by the SUs. For comparison purposes, we have fixed three different values of the parameter Imax
according to different PU minimum data rate requirements (cf. Table II).
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Importantly, as far as the LP model is concerned, Fig. 5 shows that a high pricing parameter λ0 brings no revenue to
the PU because it acts as a severe transmission disincentive to the SUs (cf. Fig. 3, where we saw that SUs shut down
beyond a certain threshold value λ∗0). Because of this behavior, there exists a critical value λc0 for the pricing parameter
that maximizes the PUs’ revenue: the calculation of this critical value lies beyond the scope of this paper, but it is
evident that λc0 increases when the maximum tolerable interference I
max imposed by PUs also increases. On the other
hand, the PUs’ revenue under the VP model is almost always zero (or close to zero): the reason for this is that the
VP model acts as a soft barrier (which hardens in the large λ0 limit), so users tend to respect the PUs’ requirements
and thus incur no transmission-related penalties. In other words, we see that if the PU’s QoS requirements are not too
sharp, then the LP model acts as a good source for revenue; otherwise, if the PU’s rate requirements are tight, the VP
model guarantees that SUs will respect them but does not generate any income. Also, note that under both the LP and
VP models, the rate of the PU is always equal or higher than his minimum required data rate (dotted lines). This is an
important result that shows that pricing regulates the SUs’ behavior indirectly (based on the PU’s QoS requirements
and revenue targets), simply by fine-tuning the exact pricing model and its parameters (e.g., λ0).
Figs. 6(a)–6(c) compare the performance of the proposed power allocation scheme to the benchmark case of
uniform power allocation – i.e., when SUs transmit at full power and allocate their power uniformly over the available
subcarriers, irrespective of the PU’s requirements. For some values of λ0, the SUs’ sum-rate under uniform power
allocation is higher than the one achieved by the proposed approach, but this comes at the expense of violating the
PU’s minimum QoS requirements (which constitutes a contractual breach from the PU’s perspective); on the contrary,
our approach always respects the PU’s contractual requirements (since the λ0 pricing parameter is negotiated with
the PU), while guaranteeing high throughput to the SUs. This is seen in Fig. 6(b): the PU’s throughput exceeds the
throughput achieved when SUs employ a uniform power allocation policy, except when the PU has no significant
QoS requirements (Imax → ∞), in which case the SUs exploit all the available spectrum and the PU’s rate is reduced.
Furthermore, in Fig. 6(c) we illustrate the normalized revenue of the proposed approach w.r.t. the revenues generated
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by uniform power allocation policies. Note that the income generated by the proposed approach is up to 3× higher
than the income generated by SUs that are not cost-/energy-aware and transmit naïvely at full power, using a uniform
power allocation policy.4 Thus, by fine-tuning his pricing scheme, the PU not only achieves his QoS requirements, but
also increases his monetary revenue against cost-aware SUs.
In Figs. 7 and 8, we investigate the length of the system’s off-equilibrium phase and the convergence rate of the
proposed distributed learning scheme (Algorithm 1). By Theorem 2, the iterations of Algorithm 1 converge to Nash
equilibrium when using a step-size sequence γn such that
∑n
j=1 γ
2
j
/ ∑n
j=1 γ j → 0 as n → ∞. As discussed in [13], a
rapidly decreasing step-size sequence slows down the algorithm, so we examine here the usage of a fixed step size to
accelerate convergence. This choice makes the algorithm run faster; on the other hand, a fixed step-size may lead to
unwanted oscillations around the equilibrium point, thus interfering with the algorithm’s end-state. To account for this,
we employ an adaptive search-then-converge (STC) approach [29]: we start with a large, constant step-size which is
then decreased as soon as oscillations are detected.5 By means of this approach, Algorithm 1 is very aggressive during
the first non-oscillating iterations and it becomes more conservative (thus guaranteeing convergence) once oscillations
are noticed.
To assess the method’s efficiency, we plotted the system’s equilibration level (EQL) defined as:
EQL(n) = Vn − Vmin
Vmax − Vmin
(24)
where Vn ≡ V(p(n)) is the potential (10) of the game at the n-th iteration of the algorithm, and Vmin (Vmax) is
the minimum (maximum) value of V; obviously, an EQL value of 1 means that the system is at Nash equilibrium.
Accordingly, in Fig. 7, we show the evolution of the EQL and the system’s sum-rate at each iteration for different step-
4Recall here that the VP model does not generate any revenue so, to reduce clutter, the corresponding curves are not shown.
5Note that such a step-size schedule still satisfies the summability postulates of Theorem 2.
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size rules and interference pricing models. As expected, a conservative step-size of the form γn = n−β, 1/2 < β < 1,
leads to relatively slow convergence (of the order of several tens of iterations or worse). On the other hand, the use of
STC and fixed-step methods greatly accelerates the users’ learning rate: after only a few STC iterations the system’s
EQL exceeds 90%, and the algorithm’s convergence is accelerated even further by increasing the constant step-size in
the “exploration” phase of the STC method.
To investigate the scalability of the proposed learning scheme, we also examine the algorithm’s convergence speed
for different numbers of SUs. In Fig. 8 we show the number of iterations needed to reach an EQL of 95%: importantly,
by increasing the value of the algorithm’s step-size, it is possible to reduce the system’s transient phase to a few
iterations, even for large numbers of users. Moreover, we also note that the algorithm’s convergence speed in the
LP model depends on the pricing parameter λ0 (it decreases with λ0), whereas this is no longer the case under the
VP model. The reason for this is again that the VP model acts as a “barrier” which is only activated when the PUs’
interference tolerance is violated.
Finally, to investigate the impact of mobility and channel fading on the users’ learning process, we consider a system
with three SUs (K = 3) and three independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian fast-fading orthogonal
subcarriers (S = 3). In Fig. 9, we plot the system’s EQL with respect to the ergodic potential (20) under the LP model
as a function of different price settings and step-size rules. Remarkably, even in this stochastic setting, Algorithm 1
still converges to the game’s NE in a few iterations and, as before, the algorithm’s convergence rate is improved by
choosing more aggressive step-size sequences.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we considered a game-theoretic formulation of the problem of cost-efficient throughput maximization
in multi-carrier CR networks where SUs are charged based on the interference that they cause to the system’s PUs.
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We showed that the resulting game admits a unique Nash equilibrium under fairly mild conditions (and for both static
and ergodic channels), and we derived a fully distributed learning algorithm that converges to equilibrium using only
local SINR and channel measurements (and, again, under both static and fast-fading channel conditions). Our analysis
shows that the choice of the exact pricing scheme has a strong impact on the network’s achievable performance (for
both licensed and unlicensed users): in the “soft-pricing” regime, the PUs’ requirements are violated in exchange for
monetary reimbursement; by contrast, higher prices safeguard the PUs’ requirements, but (somewhat surprisingly)
generate no revenue to the PUs. Moreover, thanks to the fast convergence of the proposed algorithm, the system’s
transient (off-equilibrium) phase is minimized, so SUs avoid being unduly uncharged for relatively low throughput
levels.
Some important questions that remain is the behavior of the system under arbitrarily time-varying channel conditions
corresponding to more general fading models (not necessarily following a stationary ergodic process), and the case
of imperfect SINR measurements and channel knowledge at the transmitter. We intend to explore these directions in
future work.
Appendix
Technical Proofs
A. Equilibrium analysis
Proof of Theorem 1: We will first show that the game’s potential V is strictly concave under assumption (A1)
(i.e., if πk is strictly increasing in each of its arguments). To that end, let V0 = ∑s log(σ2s + ws) − π0, V+ = −∑k πk and
differentiate V = V0 + V+ to obtain:
∂V
∂pks
=
∂V0
∂pks
+
∂V+
∂pks
=
∂V0
∂ws
gks −
∂πk
∂pks
, (25)
and hence:
∂2V
∂pks ∂pℓs′
= gksgℓs′
∂2V0
∂ws ∂ws′
−
∂2πk
∂pks ∂pks′
δkℓ = −gksgℓs′A0ss′ − δkℓB
k
ss′, (26)
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where, in obvious notation:
A0ss′ = −
∂2V0
∂ws ∂ws′
and Bkss′ =
∂2πk
∂pks ∂pks′
. (27)
Since V0 is strictly concave in w (as the sum of a strictly concave function and a concave function), it follows that
{A0ss′} is positive-definite. Accordingly, since A0ss′ does not depend on k, any zero eigenvector z ∈ KS of the KS ×KS
matrix gksgℓs′A0ss′ must satisfy: ∑
k
gkszks = 0 for all s ∈ S. (28)
The degeneracy condition (28) reflects the fact that if w(p′) = ∑k gks p′ks = ∑k gks pks = w(p) for two power profiles
p, p′ ∈ X, then V0(p) = V0(p′); Eq. (28) shows in addition that V0 admits no other directions along which it is constant.
From this, it follows that the kernel Z of Hess(V) is at most S -dimensional; since arg max V lies in an affine subspace
of KS that is parallel to Z, we conclude that the Nash set of G is a convex polytope of dimension at most KS − S , as
claimed.
Assume now that p∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G. If there exists a subcarrier s ∈ S such that p∗ks = 0 for all k ∈ K,
then any profile with pks = Pk for all k ∈ K cannot be Nash – and vice versa. Thus, without loss of generality (and after
relabeling indices if necessary), we may assume that there exists a subcarrier s ∈ S such that p∗ks < p∗ℓs for two users
k, ℓ ∈ K. With this in mind, assume that every user-specific price function πk is increasing in each of its arguments and
consider the tangent vector z ∈ KS with zks = gℓs, zℓs = −gks, and zk′ s′ = 0 otherwise. By (28), it follows that
f (t) = V(p∗ + tz) (29)
is constant for all sufficiently small t ≥ 0 (note that p∗+ tz ∈ X for small t ≥ 0). However, by differentiating, we obtain:
d f
dt =
d
dt
[
V0(p∗ + tz) −∑k′ πk′(p∗k′ + tzk′ )
]
= −
∂πk
∂pks
zks −
∂πℓ
∂pℓs
zℓs = gks
∂πℓ
∂pℓs
− gℓs
∂πk
∂pks
, (30)
so we must have
gks
∂πℓ
∂pℓs
∣∣∣∣∣
p∗+tz
= gℓs
∂πk
∂pks
∣∣∣∣∣
p∗+tz
for all sufficiently small t ≥ 0. (31)
With πk, πℓ strictly increasing, this only holds if πk (resp. πℓ) is linear in pks (resp. pks) and the channel gain coefficients
gks, gℓs have the required ratio. This last condition is a (Lebesgue) measure zero event, so our assertion follows.
Otherwise, assume that (A2) holds, implying in particular that ∂V0
∂ws
= (σ2s + ws)−1 − ∂π0∂ws maintains the same sign for
all possible values of ws. Then, in view of the previous discussion, it suffices to prove uniqueness in the special case
where the price functions πk are constant in a neighborhood of p∗. In this case, the first order Karush–Kuhn–Tucker
(KKT) conditions for (12) take the form:
a) rsgks − λk ≤ 0, (32a)
b) pks [rsgks − λk] = 0, (32b)
where λk is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the total power constraint
∑
s pks ≤ Pk and
rs =
(
1
σ2s + ws
−
∂π0
∂ws
)−1
. (33)
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Thus, with rs , 0 by assumption, we obtain:
gks
gks′
=
rs
r′s
for all s, s′ ∈ supp(p∗k), (34)
i.e., every user k ∈ K is “load-balancing” the quantity gks/rs over all employed subcarriers.
By using a graph-theoretic method introduced in [30], we may deduce that the following hold except on a set of
(Lebesgue) measure zero; indeed:
1) No two users k, ℓ ∈ K can be using the same two subcarriers s, s′ at equilibrium: if this were the case, we would
have gks/gks′ = gℓs/gℓs′ , a measure zero event.
2) There is at most S −1 instances of users employing more than one subcarrier. Indeed, assume that user k j employs
subcarriers s j, s′j, with j = 1, . . . , N, N ≥ S . Then, by the pigeonhole principle, there exists a subset of pairs (s j, s′j)
that forms a cycle of length L ≥ N in the graph with vertex set S. Hence, by relabeling indices if necessary, we
obtain the cycle relation:
gk1,s1
gk2,s2
gk2,s2
gk3,s3
· · ·
gkL−1,sL−1
gkL,sL
=
rs1
rs2
rs2
rs3
· · ·
rsL−1
rsL
= 1, (35)
where we have used the fact that s1 = sL. This represents a measure zero condition, so our assertion follows.
The above shows that p∗ lies in the interior of a face of X with dimension at most S − 1. Since the Nash set
of G is a convex polytope of dimension KS − S , we conclude that any Nash equilibrium lies at the intersection of
a g-independent (S − 1)-dimensional and a g-dependent (KS − S )-dimensional subspace of KS . However, since
KS − S + S − 1 < KS , the intersection of these subspaces is trivial on a set of full (Lebesgue) measure with respect to
the choice of the g-dependent subspace, implying that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
B. Convergence of exponential learning
The basic idea of our convergence proof is as follows: we will first show that the iterates of Algorithm 1 track (in a
certain sense that will be made precise below) the “mean-field” dynamics:
y˙k = vk(p),
pks = Pk
exp(yks)
1 +
∑
s′∈S exp(yks′)
.
(36)
Theorem 2 will then follow by showing that the dynamics (36) converge to the maximum set of the game’s potential
(and, hence, to Nash equilibrium) for any itial condition y(0).
For simplicity, in the rest of this appendix (and unless explicitly stated otherwise), we will work with a single user
with maximum transmit power P = 1; the general case is simply a matter of taking a direct sum over k ∈ K and
rescaling by the corresponding maximum power Pk of each user. With this in mind, let D = {p ∈ S+ : 0 ≤
∑
s ps ≤ 1}
denote the standard S -dimensional “corner-of-cube”,6 and consider the entropy-like function:
h(p) =
∑
s
ps log ps +
(
1 −
∑
s
ps
)
log
(
1 −
∑
s
ps
)
. (37)
6Recall that each user’s action space is a corner-of-cube.
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A key element of our proof will be the associated Bregman divergence [31, 32]:
Dh(p∗, p) = h(p∗) − h(p) −
〈
∇ph
∣∣∣p∗ − p〉 = ∑
s
p∗s log
p∗s
ps
+
(
1 −
∑
s
p∗s
)
log
1 −
∑
s p∗s
1 −
∑
s ps
, (38)
with the continuity convention 0 log 0 = 0. The Bregman divergence (38) resembles the well known Kullback–Leibler
(KL) divergence in the same sense that h resembles the ordinary Gibbs–Shannon entropy: in particular, by exploiting
the properties of the KL divergence, it is easy to see that Dh(p∗, p) ≥ 0 for all p∗, p ∈ D, with equality if and only if
p = p∗; in this sense, Dh(p∗, p) provides an oriented distance measure between p∗ and p in D.
Employing the Bregman divergence, we can prove the following convergence result:
Proposition 3. Every solution orbit p(t) of the dynamics (36) converges to Nash equilibrium in G.
Proof: Let p∗ be a Nash equilibrium of G, and let H(t) = Dh(p∗, p(t)). We then have:
H = h(p∗) + log
(
1 +
∑
s
eys
)
−
∑
s
p∗sys, (39)
and hence:
˙H =
∑
s y˙seys
1 +
∑
s e
ys
−
∑
s
p∗sy˙s =
∑
s
psy˙s −
∑
s
p∗sy˙s =
∑
s
(ps − p∗s)vs = 〈p − p∗|v〉 . (40)
By concavity of V and the fact that v = ∇pu = ∇pV , it follows that 〈p − p∗|v〉 ≥ 0 with equality holding if and only if
p is a maximizer of V (and, hence, a Nash equilibrium of G).
To show that p(t) converges to a Nash equilibrium of G, assume that p∗ is an ω-limit of p(t), i.e., p(tn) → p∗ for
some increasing sequence tn → ∞ (that p(t) admits at least one ω-limit follows from the fact that D is compact). This
implies that H(tn) → 0, and since ˙H ≥ 0, we also get limt→∞ H(t) = 0, so p(t) → p∗ by the definition of the Bregman
divergence.
With this result at hand, we have:
Proof of Theorem 2: We will first show that the basic recursion of Algorithm 1 comprises a stochastic approx-
imation of the dynamics (36) in the sense of [26]. Indeed, it is easy to see that the exponential regularization map
(16) is Lipschitz; moreover, since D is compact and the game’s potential function is smooth on D, it follows that the
composite map y 7→ v(p(y)) is also Lipschitz. As a result, by Propositions 4.2 and 4.1 of [26], we conclude that the
recursion
y(n + 1) = y(n) + γnv(p(n)),
p(n + 1) = 1
1 +
∑
s e
ys(n+1) (e
y1(n+1), . . . , eyS (n+1)),
(XL)
is an asymptotic pseudotrajectory (APT) of the continuous-time dynamics (36).
Now, let D∗ denote the set of Nash equilibria of G, and assume ad absurdum that p(n) remains a bounded distance
away from D∗. Furthermore, fix some p∗ ∈ D∗ and let Dn = Dh(p∗, p(n)); then, using (40), we obtain the Taylor
expansion:
Dn+1 = Dh(p∗, p(n + 1)) = Dh(p∗, p(y(n) + γnv(p(n))))
≤ Dn − γn 〈v(p(n))|p∗ − p(n)〉 + 12 Mγ2n ‖v(p(n))‖2 , (41)
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for some constant M > 0 (that such a constant exists is a consequence of the fact that Hess(h) < mI for some
m > 0 [33]). Since p(n) stays a bounded distance away from D∗ (by assumption) and V is concave, we will also have
〈v(p(n))|p∗ − p(n)〉 ≥ δ for some δ > 0 and for all n. Hence, telescoping (41), we get:
Dn+1 ≤ D0 − δ
∑n
j=0 γ j +
1
2
Mv2
∑n
j=0 γ
2
j , (42)
where we have set v = supp∈D ‖v(p)‖. Since
∑∞
j=1 γ
2
j
/∑∞
j=1 γ j → 0, this last inequality yields limn→∞ Dn = −∞,
a contradiction. We thus conclude that p(n) visits a compact neighborhood of D∗ infinitely often, so our claim of
convergence follows from [26, Theorem 6.10].
C. The fast-fading case
Our goal in this appendix is to prove uniqueness of NE in the ergodic game ¯G (Prop. 2) and the convergence of
Algorithm 1 in the presence of fast fading.
Proof of Proposition 2: That ¯V is an exact potential for ¯G follows directly by inspection, as in the case of
Proposition 1. For the strict concavity of ¯V , let Hessg(V) denote the Hessian of the static potential function V for
a given realization of the channel gain coefficients g. Then, with V bounded and smooth over X, the dominated
convergence theorem allows us to interchange differentiation and integration, so we obtain Hess( ¯V) = g[Hessg(V)].
Thus, for all z ∈ KS , we will have:
z† · Hess( ¯V) · z = g [z† · Hessg(V) · z] ≥ 0. (43)
From the proof of Theorem 1, we know that z† · Hessg(V) · z only if ∑k gkszks = 0 for all s ∈ S; however, since this
is a measure zero event (recall that the law of g is atom-free), we will have z† · Hessg(V) · z > 0 on a set of positive
measure. This shows that z† · Hess( ¯V) · z > 0 for all z ∈ KS , i.e., ¯V is strictly concave. We conclude that ¯G admits a
unique equilibrium, as claimed.
Proof of Theorem 3: The same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 2 shows that the iterates of Algorithm
1 run with the players’ instantaneous utilities calculated as in (21) comprise a stochastic approximation (asymptotic
pseudotrajectory) of the mean dynamics:
y˙k = v¯k(p),
pks = Pk
exp(yks)
1 +
∑
s′∈S exp(yks′)
.
(44)
Again, by following the same steps as in the Proof of Theorem 2, we can show that the dynamics (44) converge to the
unique Nash equilibrium of the ergodic game ¯G; as such, it suffices to show that any APT of (44) induced by Alg. 1
converges to equilibrium.
To that end, with notation as in (41), we readily obtain:
Dn+1 = Dh(p∗, p(n + 1)) ≤ Dn − γn 〈vˆ(n)|p∗ − p(n)〉 + 12 Mγ2n ‖vˆ(n)‖2 , (45)
where p∗ is the (unique) NE of ¯G and M > 0 is a positive constant. Assume now that p(n) remains a bounded distance
away from p∗ (so Dn is bounded away from zero), and let ξn = 〈vˆ(n) − v¯(p(n))|p(n) − p∗〉. Since ¯V is (strictly) concave
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and p(n) stays a bounded distance away from its maximum set, we will have 〈v¯(p(n))|p∗ − p(n)〉 ≤ −m for some
positive constant m > 0. Hence, telescoping (45) yields:
Dn+1 ≤ D0 − tn
(
m −
∑n
j=1 w j,n ξ j
)
+
1
2 M
∑n
j=1 γ
2
j ‖vˆ( j)‖2 , (46)
where tn =
∑n
j=1 γ j and w j,n = γ j/tn. By the strong law of large numbers for martingale differences [34, Theorem
2.18], we will have n−1 ∑nj=1 ξ j → 0 (a.s.); hence, with γn+1/γn ≤ 1, Hardy’s weighted summability criterion [35,
p. 58] applied to the weight sequence w j,n = γ j/tn yields
∑n
j=1 w j,n ξ j → 0 (a.s.). Finally, since γn is square-summable
and vˆ(n)− v¯(p(n)) is a martingale difference with finite variance, it follows that ∑∞n=1 γ2n ‖vˆ(n)‖2 < ∞ (a.s.) by Theorem
6 in [36].
Combining all of the above, we obtain that the RHS of (42) tends to −∞ (a.s.); this contradicts the fact that Dn ≥ 0,
so we conclude that p(n) visits a compact neighborhood of p∗ infinitely often. Since p∗ is a global attractor of (44),
Theorem 6.10 in [26] shows that p(n) converges to p∗ (a.s.).
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